Every major therapeutic and preventive ...

Every major health care setting (the company that produces medical services) under oligopoly is trying to behave like a monopoly whose activities are, however, limited the power of competition. Under perfect competition, due to the fact that the success of oligopolists is possible due to the weakening position of companies and competitors, the conflicts in this market sometimes lead to fierce competition. In practice, often the reverse occurs. Medical institutions at the level of the parent or coordinating health authority seeking to reach an agreement (cartel) over the division of medical services market (directive is binding service area for each health facility, and inside the territories - fixing a certain number of service users for a particular medical office). Approved plans of state guarantees the provision of free medical care. Coordinated and approved by the relevant tariffs cost of medical services, etc. As a result, the set of MPI-oligopolists actually acts as a pure monopoly, but formally they are excluded from the antitrust authority of a State. At first approximation, oligopoly may be confused with the functional-structural form of organization. The distinguishing feature of an oligopoly of functional and structural forms of organization is that the emergence of an oligopoly is possible if the vector evolution of the organizational structure of the level of actual availability of a variety of competing health care facilities in the markets of medical services. Oligopoly is generated by the market of pure competition, based on the contract of stakeholders, and can not be created by policy settings. Ambiguity and complexity of oligopoly due to a lack of its full elaboration of the theory. Currently, it is the least-studied model of competition. Consider the example of the mechanism of oligopoly cartel (1). Figure 1. Market equilibrium under conditions of oligopoly (cartel) Assume there is a market for medical services under pure competition, where the equilibrium price is equal to U0, the unit costs for all health care facilities are equal and the curve coincides with the supply curve to the medical services market in the long run. In this case, the equilibrium price U0 sales volume of medical services will be R0 and health care setting will be able to adequately cover the relevant costs in the production of medical services. If we assume that these medical institutions have agreed on cooperation (and in practice, and occurs at the level of the parent body), the overall direction will be to argue as a monopolist. Due to the fact that the maximum profit of a monopolist is achieved with this issue when the marginal cost equals marginal revenue, output oligopoly is likely to drop to K1 and the price will be increased to C1. For each company will implement a quota of medical services, a total of K1, which is naturally less than the initial amount of K 0.